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KEY ISSUES
Information and communication technology
7. Effective record keeping and ease of access to information is key to an effective response to domestic abuse. Because domestic abuse has the highest rate of repeat victimisation of any crime, and because only a proportion of all incidents are reported to the police, every call represents an opportunity to identify a pattern of abuse and to intervene to prevent further or escalating acts of violence in the future. Without readily accessible information about the victim's or perpetrator's previous contact with the police, these kinds of critical intervention are difficult.
8.Hitting Home (1997) made a clear recommendation in relation to recording and using relevant information:
"Recommendation 3: That forces develop information technology which will automatically provide officers attending at the scene of a reported domestic incident, via communications staff, with any relevant information on the address or alleged perpetrator or which is already held on one or more of that force's databases or on any police national database."
9. Some progress had been made towards addressing this recommendation in the intervening ten years, e.g. attaching flags or occurrence markers to specific addresses on incident recording and management systems. Front-line officers confirmed that, where this information was available, the controller usually passed it to them. Several shortcomings remained though. For example, the information was stored only by address and not by nominal (i.e. person).
10. Police information systems have developed in a fragmented fashion over the years, and as a result the process of retrieving information is not always straightforward. In addition to the incident recording system, most forces had in place some form of database to hold information on domestic abuse victims and perpetrators, which tended to be maintained by DAOs. In the majority of forces, however, these databases did not communicate with other force systems. Consequently, retrieving the most comprehensive information necessitated searches of the separate systems. We were particularly concerned to find that in many areas the domestic abuse information was held separately from child protection information.
11. Worryingly, in many areas, front-line officers could not easily access information on the databases, particularly outside office hours when the majority of domestic abuse incidents occur. A number of reasons were given for this, ranging from insufficient time to access the system and lack of familiarity with search facilities, to restricted or even no access having been granted to controllers in police contact centres and front-line officers. In one force, the officers we interviewed were not even aware that such a database existed. Many front-line officers revealed that they were not routinely given, nor did they have direct access to, the more detailed information held on the databases when en route to calls or compiling reports to the procurator fiscal, even though pertinent information is vital to assist decision-making in this high-risk area. This was confirmed by members of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, who told us that the reports they received from front-line officers regularly failed to contain the fullest possible contextual information. This too reflects, in part, failings in forces' current information systems.
12. Another finding was the absence of a single system for the efficient sharing of domestic abuse data across force boundaries in Scotland. We were particularly concerned that in some instances the inability to share information extended to divisions within the same force. Instead of maintaining one single database, some forces had separate, stand-alone systems serving discrete geographical sectors of the area. Thus, for example, if a domestic abuse victim moved to another area of the force, no-one at the new location would know their domestic abuse history because their details would remain at the original location. Consequently we conclude that these stand-alone databases are not fit for purpose and therefore potentially pose a risk to victims that should be addressed as soon as possible.
13. The ACPOS Business Change Programme Board is working towards a longer-term solution to shortcomings in data-sharing generally, through a broader programme of development. However, this is unlikely to come to fruition for a number of years. In the meantime some forces were expending considerable resources in procuring and developing their own systems, whilst others had adopted a wait-and-see approach. Despite our recommendation being made more than ten years ago, this shortcoming is still to be resolved. In our opinion, any further delay is unacceptable.
14. The risk to victims that this situation poses is widespread and largely unmitigated. We therefore strongly recommend that a national database, in conjunction with national data standards, be developed and adopted by all forces as a matter of priority.
15. Previous HMICS inspections, most notably Common Knowledge: A Thematic Inspection of Intelligence & Information Sharing7, focused on the need for the police and their partner agencies to share information to facilitate better joint working. HMICS maintains this position. Nevertheless we also point out that there is much that police forces can do to sort out their own internal information management arrangements for the benefit of all.
Recommendation 1: That the requirement for a national database of perpetrators and victims be urgently addressed by all forces.
Domestic abuse units
16. We found some contradictions in organisational approaches to domestic abuse both between forces and, in some cases, across internal force boundaries. The key differences related to the location of specialist DAOs and domestic abuse policy officers, some of whom were located within crime management, others within community safety departments. In our opinion, established links between domestic abuse and child abuse reinforce the need to place specialist DAOs alongside child protection officers in order to facilitate effective information-sharing and case management. Whatever the arrangement, communication between DAOs and those working in specialist areas where there are clear links with domestic abuse, must not be hindered by unnecessary organisational barriers.
17. Across Scotland, the role of specialist domestic abuse officers has developed to differing degrees. Their importance was highlighted in our 1997 report, which recommended that all forces consider the need for such designated staff. Approximately ten years on, seven of the eight forces in Scotland had designated specialist officers. The exception was Northern Constabulary, where the role continued to be seen as an ancillary one carried out by uniform officers. We continue to maintain that the deployment of designated specialist officers is good practice.
18. Forces had also made considerable, albeit inconsistent, progress in relation to the structure and staffing of domestic abuse units. As public awareness and police understanding of domestic abuse has increased over the last ten years, so the range of duties undertaken by DAOs has developed accordingly. As a result, significantly more domestic abuse incidents are being reported and greater demands are being made on force ICT systems. In addition, there is now greater commitment to multi-agency working, a wider recognition of the links with child protection, and more widespread use of risk assessment. Statistical analysis indicates that more male, as well as more lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender ( LGBT), victims are now willing to report incidents of domestic abuse to the police. This presents further challenges not only for the DAO role but for training and the Service's general approach to domestic abuse (see recommendation 3).
19. Despite these changing demands, and the priority given to domestic abuse policy at a force level, resource levels in some specialist units had changed little over the last ten years. In many areas DAOs questioned whether, given the volume of cases they were expected to deal with, they were able to provide an adequate service to victims. Often DAO staffing levels had not been reviewed, nor had attempts been made to match these to demand. In some divisions, DAOs were regularly abstracted to perform uniform duties including, for example, paid attendance at football matches. Given the key role DAOs play in responding to domestic abuse, we consider it vital that the demands placed on these officers are recognised and understood.
20. This inspection confirmed that there is no standard model for the DAO role across Scotland. Their spectrum of activities included supporting victims, liaising with external agencies, administering domestic abuse databases, participating in investigations and making sure that force policy is adhered to. In some areas the exact functions and remit of the role were more likely to reflect the drive and personality of the individual DAO than any considered policy document. Our view is that the providing of information and support, as well as referring victims to other agencies, falls within the policing remit; it is important that DAOs do not go beyond this and attempt to engage in counselling or other non-policing activities that are best left to those with the appropriate skills and training.
21. Many DAOs routinely worked on their own, even when visiting victims' homes. Given the potential for violence in these situations, we urge that each visit be risk-assessed and that all DAOs carry their officer safety equipment with them. In addition, many DAOs used their own car to visit victims. We believe that doing so presents a personal risk to officers and should be discontinued.
22. In many forces administration had become their dominant task, inhibiting opportunities both for contact with victims and pro-active efforts to tackle repeat victimisation. One DAO had a three-month backlog of incidents waiting to be placed on the domestic abuse database, leading to inevitable shortcomings in information management, which, in our view is unacceptable. We recognise that organisational and local circumstances mean that DAO roles need not be identical across Scotland, but we do believe that forces should guard against administrative tasks detracting from their core role of providing as excellent a service as possible to the public.
23. More concerning therefore, was the finding that the actual support provided to victims of domestic abuse varied both between and within forces. It was apparent that there was no standard approach either to follow-up contact with victims or to implementing victim safety measures. The service provided was often unpredictable and lacked focus, making it difficult to monitor or co-ordinate activity. We do, however, commend the introduction in some areas (Grampian & East Lothian) of structured processes of victim contact and safety planning linked to risk assessment.
24. We believe the DAO role to be a valuable, though under-exploited, resource. Moreover, regional variations in the actual functions of the role are confusing for victims and other agencies. We identified a number of factors and examples of good practice that, if followed by all forces, would improve their operational effectiveness in this area:
- a strong central role for DAOs in establishing, co-ordinating, monitoring and reviewing consistency of practice;
- opportunities for DAOs to share good practice and be updated with national developments;
- co-locating DAOs and child protection officers;
- clear and active line-management;
- adequate administrative support;
- the application of a risk assessment model to allow a structured, consistent response to victim and perpetrator management (see recommendation 4); and
- the inclusion of domestic abuse in the tasking and co-ordination process to promote divisional ownership and bring domestic abuse into mainstream policing.
Recommendation 2: That the domestic abuse officer role is reviewed in line with the identified good practice in this report.
Staff development and competence
25. The 1997 report Hitting Home made specific recommendations in relation to training:
"Recommendation 4: That forces review procedures and training to ensure that any history of domestic violence is considered by attending officers at the time or immediately after the current incident and that such history is recorded by them in the crime/incident report."
"Recommendation 12: That forces review the content and extent of in-force training on domestic violence, bearing in mind the need for probationer and other constables to receive awareness as well as procedural training, the value of involving Women's Aid workers in delivery, and new provision to first-line managers by the Scottish Police College."
26. Since Hitting Home, the Scottish Government had published its National Domestic Abuse Training Strategy8, supported by local multi-agency training consortia in receipt of Government funding to roll out the strategy. Whilst HMICS acknowledges this development and supports police involvement in these fora, it also recognises the need for specific and specialised development and support for police officers.
27. During the fieldwork for this inspection, front-line officers in all eight forces said that they had received little or no training in domestic abuse beyond that received in their probationary training period. In some cases, officers with ten or more years' service had received no training at all. The abstraction of front-line officers for training purposes is a widely reported challenge for forces. Therefore, it would seem sensible for us to point to two specific areas for attention, neither of which necessarily require conventional classroom style training, but instead lend themselves to briefing, coaching and general awareness raising.
28. Firstly, our fieldwork revealed widespread misunderstanding about the sufficiency of evidence required to prosecute domestic abuse cases. While the evidential standards are clearly laid out in the ACPOS and COPFS joint protocol, officers were not strictly adhering to them, possibly through a lack of understanding. It is obviously vital that officers are clear about the level of evidence required in these cases, and we would therefore support any attempt to make the protocol even more explicit in this regard. Similarly, officers must also be aware of the importance of including background information in standard prosecution reports, and know how to retrieve such information (see recommendation 1).
29. Secondly, various risk assessment models were in use across forces. These were widely seen to provide useful support to officers attending domestic abuse incidents and gathering information. We were concerned to note, though, that a number of officers were not fully aware of how to use a risk assessment model to gather and assess information effectively. We believe that this diminishes the value of any risk assessment process and may in turn potentially expose victims to some risk.
30. In our opinion, sergeants should be key to ensuring that scene attendance; investigations; evidence gathering; report writing and information recording meet the required standard. In practice, DAOs in all areas told us that they are regularly relied upon to act as gate-keepers, to monitor compliance with force policy and spend significant amounts of time making sure that front-line officers submit the appropriate paperwork. Though all sergeants attend the first-line managers course at the Scottish Police College ( SPC), which includes an input on domestic abuse, we propose that this be supported by in-force support to grow competence and confidence in this area.
31. As far as DAOs were concerned, most claimed to have received little or no training prior to starting in post, with the formal college course typically being undertaken some time after their appointment. At the time of the inspection a number of forces had already recognised the need for an induction package for DAOs. We believe that this need extends to wider support for specialist and front-line officers, given their shared responsibility for managing incidents of domestic abuse.
32. Some DAOs suggested that the formal college course conflicted with their force policy in some way. It would seem appropriate, therefore, for existing police training to be reviewed to ensure that it reflects the national perspective and, that it is informed by the Scottish Crime Recording Standard ( SCRS) as well as the ACPOS/ COPFS joint protocol. Indeed we would encourage the development of a national support package covering all the relevant areas identified in this report, including risk assessment. This would help to promote a common standard across the Service, raising the quality of service of all forces to the same high level whilst minimising unnecessary geographical variation and areas of duplicate work.
Recommendation 3: That all forces work together (with the Scottish Police Services Authority ( SPSA) where appropriate), to develop a common approach to training and support for officers.
Risk assessment
33. We found it to be broadly accepted that decisions about prioritising cases, allocating resources and the nature and intensity of involvement should be informed by risk assessment. Intelligence can be better used by informing such assessment and ensuring that risk management is used to target cases where the risk of repeat victimisation is most serious. Risk assessment tools offer a structured way for 'first response' officers to gather pertinent information from victims. This information, particularly when shared with other agencies, can help to shape a more responsive service for victims and provides a framework for decision-making that allows police resources to be targeted in a structured and informed manner. The risk assessment process fits in well with the National Intelligence Model ( NIM) framework of intelligence, prevention and enforcement and, when applied properly, can serve as an effective case management tool.
34. As noted already, we found that a number of different victim-focused risk assessment models had been adopted or were being piloted, their exact nature and level of implementation varying across the eight forces. They ranged from risk assessment based on police data only, to the use of multi-agency conferencing for high-risk cases. In some cases, models had been adapted to local circumstances. We believe this to be acceptable, provided that the core elements of risk assessment are used consistently.
35. In most areas we encountered a somewhat ad hoc approach to both victim support and perpetrator management; typically DAOs applied their professional judgement to the limited information provided by front-line officers who, in turn, had usually received no training on risk indicators. Similar observations were made by Women's Aid who, while praising and supportive of the DAO role, pointed to inconsistencies in the level of support offered to victims in different areas. Professional judgement, though always important, does not offer the consistency, transparency and accountability of a formalised process. Furthermore, the DAO response tended only to focus on supporting the victim; our findings suggest a Service-wide failure to target the perpetrator effectively for the purpose of preventing the recurrence of incidents.
36. Many uniform officers with whom we spoke during our fieldwork were positive about the use of risk indicators. Those that had received it, valued additional training on this aspect of assessment and had a better understanding of the dynamics of domestic abuse as a result. As well as an important means to structure and inform decision-making, DAOs saw the indicators as an effective way of flagging up high-risk cases in the tasking and co-ordinating process and thereby instigating subsequent action.
37. However, it must be recognised that the management of risk in domestic abuse is complex and dynamic. We have identified a number of concerns relating to the current use of risk assessment, including:
- a lack of training for officers gathering risk indicators or for those carrying out risk assessments;
- previous risk assessment information not being available to call handlers and first response officers;
- failure to manage the administrative burden of introducing risk assessment by not providing adequate administrative support for DAOs;
- failure to ensure that the most efficient means is employed, not unnecessarily burdensome;
- failure to acknowledge the resources required to monitor and review individual risk assessments or to have a review process in place;
- failure to include risk information in reports to the procurator fiscal and other agencies; and
- the introduction of separate databases to hold risk assessments, which are not linked to existing systems.
38. Some of these concerns relate to matters of training and information technology, which we have addressed in recommendations 1 and 3. The national IT solution referred to in recommendation 1 should incorporate the risk assessment and risk management of both victims and perpetrators of domestic abuse.
39. When embedded in multi-agency frameworks, victim risk assessment is an integral part of a co-ordinated community response to domestic abuse. We recognise that the introduction of multi-agency conferencing carries an administrative burden, is resource intensive and depends on the commitment of agencies other than police. Nevertheless, even a single-agency risk assessment is likely to produce a better overall response than an unstructured approach would achieve, and should ultimately pay dividends in terms of reducing chronic and escalating abuse.
40. We acknowledge that the development of a victim risk assessment model is at an early stage in Scotland. We are also aware of ACPOS' interest in the experiences and outcomes of the Getting it right approach for children and young people affected by domestic abuse. Nevertheless, we believe that there is significant benefit to be gained now from improving front-line officers' understanding of risk factors and, as a consequence, improving the quality of information gathered during their first contact with victims. We would expect that forces, through the ACPOS crime business area, will review any nationally endorsed approach in the light of findings from the Getting it right for every child ( GIRFEC) pilots.
Recommendation 4: That all forces adopt a model of victim risk assessment and risk management as soon as possible, whilst working towards implementing a single core model across Scotland, and that forces focus on ensuring the quality of the information gathered.
Incident recording
41. Different incident recording and management systems were in use across the eight forces. Consequently, over time, forces had developed and adapted their own local codes for incidents. As a result, we found no common approach to the way in which domestic abuse incidents were recorded (coded) and subsequently managed.
42. Migration to the STORM MA national incident recording and management system had begun in four of the eight force areas at the time of our inspection. The need to harmonise how incidents are coded and recorded, in tandem with this development, had been recognised and work was underway to prepare a set of common codes. We welcome this move and look forward to its implementation.
43. In all forces, a code to identify that an incident is related to a domestic matter should be, and in most instances was, applied. This can happen in the course of opening, updating or closing an incident record. However, in those areas where incidents were coded on receipt of initial information, it was quicker and easier to identify, prioritise and subsequently manage domestic abuse incidents. We commend this as good practice.
44. In addition, every force had a quality assurance process in place. This allowed them to review all incident records to ensure that force policy and procedure had been applied correctly. The intention was that this should be conducted by a supervisor at or near to the time of dealing with the actual incident. In practice, it was the DAO (or their administrative support staff) in each area who reviewed all incident records to ensure that any not appropriately recorded as domestic incidents were subsequently re-coded and dealt with accordingly. However, a combination of the large volume of incident records captured on one hand and competing demands with limited resources on the other, meant that these reviews were not always carried out. Moreover, we would question whether this type of activity is the best use of a DAO's time and skills.
45. It was clear to us that forces recognised the importance of dealing with an incident correctly and appropriately from the outset. In some areas a significant amount of time and effort had been invested in reinforcing this message amongst front-line operational staff, call handlers and control room staff, as a result of which error rates had fallen. However this is an issue that requires repeated attention.
46. All forces were aware that their existing quality assurance systems were not foolproof. In an audit of incident records that we conducted, we found examples where the initial or final coding had not been correctly applied. Some, but not all, of these had subsequently been corrected at different stages of the quality assurance process. While the number of those missed was relatively small, we consider it important that forces have in place robust structures to ensure that incident recording and subsequent management are accurate.
47. Conversely, some incident records that had been coded as relating to a domestic matter were subsequently found not to be so. Here too, not all 'false positives' were subsequently corrected on the incident recording and management system, meaning that any analysis of the data would present a misleading picture. Moreover, the potential for confusion, upset or even conflict if officers attending future incidents are given incorrect information of this kind, is obvious.
48. Our conclusions here mirror the findings of the recent HMICS thematic inspection A review of how the Scottish Crime Recording Standard has developed within the police service in Scotland since 20059. It is apparent from the information recorded on incident recording and management systems that in a number of areas the police response falls short of what might reasonably be expected from force policies and procedures. A more systematic and structured quality assurance regime for incident management is required.
Recommendation 5: That forces review and reinforce their quality assurance practices and processes for recording domestic abuse incidents.
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